This article diagnoses and critique two 'not-animal' modes of theological anthropology: first, the construction of human identity on the basis of supposed evidence of human/non-human difference; second, accounts of the human that take no account of God's other creatures. It suggests that not-animal anthropologies exhibit poor theological methodology, are based on inaccurate depictions of both humans and other animals, and result in problematic construals of what it means to be human. Instead, the article concludes, we require theological anthropologies that take as a starting point the relationship between humanity and God and recognise the animal and creaturely context of human existence. 
anthropology have been guilty of theological and factual mistakes in their rendering of the relationship between humans and other animal creatures and, as a result, theological anthropology stands in need of repair. In this 'not-animal' mode, theologians have gone about theological anthropology by looking around the world -or more commonly, drawing on accounts of philosophers who claim to have done so -listing supposed differences between humans and other animals, and building from these differences an account of the human. The resulting list of ways in which humans are not like other animals has been given a vague theological warrant through loose reference to biblical texts, with the Genesis 1. [26] [27] references to humans being made in the image of God a particular favourite. This 'notanimal' exercise is flawed in two key ways: first, it is an inadequate theological methodology; second, the data it has drawn upon comparing humans and other animals is inaccurate.
Unsurprisingly, the theological anthropology generated in this mode is unhelpful: it fails to name adequately the particular nature and role of human beings before God; it posits a misleading and hubristic gulf between human beings and other creatures; and it founds its account of human identity on the unjustifiable denial of key characteristics to other-thanhuman animals. The consequences of these mistakes have been severe: on the one hand, humanity has been identified with particular attributes such as rationality that have marginalised those humans considered to be lacking in them; on the other hand, human exploitation of other animals has been justified on the problematic basis of the separation established by this anthropological methodology. A second kind of not-animal methodology ignores the human context among other creatures entirely: picturing human beings alone, suspended in a vacuum and considered meaningful in such isolation. In addition to their other problems, these not-animal anthropologies have been problematic for theology itself: through them the coherence of Christian theology has seemed to be at stake in the maintenance of a human/non-human divide, so that, long before debates about Darwinian evolution, but continuing through them and into the present, theologians have been forced to defend claims about differences between humans and other creatures entirely irrelevant to Christian theology properly understood.
The negative aim of demonstrating the inadequacy of not-animal theological anthropologies is intended to serve a positive one: encouraging theologians to pursue anthropology in a properly theological mode, alert to the status of human beings as one of God's animal creatures. To succeed in both aims, it seems to me that I need to make the case that, (1) these not-animal modes of theological anthropology exist and have been influential, (2) that they are problematic and we have reason to find them uncomfortable, and (3) that there is a mode of proceeding with the task of theological anthropology that is preferable.
These three tasks of depicting, evaluating, and briefly proposing an alternative to not-animal modes of theological anthropology will structure the remainder of this article.
Depicting not-animal theological anthropologies
The most famous example of a supposed human/non-human difference being used to identify a key characteristic of humanity is that of Descartes. In his Discourse on Method, Descartes is fascinated by contemporary automata. He suggests that if there was a machine which 'had the organs and appearance of a monkey or some other irrational animal, we would have no means of recognizing that they were not of exactly the same nature as these animals'. 1 In contrast, if there were a machine that was like a human body and imitated human actions, Descartes argues that we could recognise that it was a machine in two ways. First, such an automaton could not use words or signs to declare their thoughts to others; second, one would discover that it did not act through knowledge but through the disposition of its organs so that it could not respond to the full range of events in life in the way that reason allows humans to that it could not be derived from matter, but must have been expressly created. One crucial aspect of this doctrine of the human soul, he argues, is that feeble minds are apt to be led astray if they think that he souls of animals are the same as our own, since they will then believe that we have nothing more to fear or hope for after this life than do flies or ants. If one can understand the uniqueness of the human soul, however, he suggests that one can appreciate the reasons that show that the soul is independent of the body and from this recognise that the soul is immortal in accordance with Christian doctrine.
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The structure of Descartes' account here is to use a comparison with other animals to establish that the crucial element of humanity, unique among earthly creatures, is a rational soul, and then to present this unique human possession of a rational soul as supporting evidence for the plausibility of the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. It is clear, I hope, even from this brief survey, that the not-animal mode of doing anthropology, either through a reflection on supposed differences between humans and other animals, or through ignoring them entirely, is widespread and influential in theological accounts. The extent to which the arguments I have cited seem routine, indicates the ease with which we could multiply theological examples of the deployment of these arguments. In addition, we should note that not-animal anthropology in the mode of identifying rationality as the key differentiating factor between humans and other earthly creatures, and the claim that rationality is a common attribute of human beings, heavenly beings, and God, has origins well before and beyond theological anthropology, and is especially closely connected to Stoicism. The obvious question that follows is whether there are good theological reasons for avoiding structuring theological anthropology in this way.
The problems with not-animal theological anthropology
In my judgement, there are three key reasons Christian theologians ought be uncomfortable with not-animal theological anthropologies, which I outline below.
a. Not-animal anthropology is not-theological anthropology
Not-animal anthropology in the mode of constructing human identity on the basis of differences from other animals, it seems to me, is exactly how one would -and perhaps
should -go about an anthropological project if one did not believe in Christianity. For those who subscribe to core Christian doctrines such as the incarnation, the Bible as the revealed word of God, and theism rather than deism, it is surely clear that the foundation of theological anthropology must be the confession of God as creator, reconciler and redeemer and the implications of this past, present and future for the living of human lives. It would be an almost inexplicable error to turn one's gaze from Christ as the true image of God (Col.
1.15), to close the covers of the book of God's revealed word, to block up one's ears to the promptings of the indwelling Spirit, and instead to seek to find a definition of the human through differential comparison with those creatures we find alongside us. This would be a form of practical atheism, going about the anthropological task as if Christianity were not true.
As I indicated in the opening to this paper, perhaps alert to this danger of being adrift from theological moorings, Christian theologians have found biblical authority for not-animal anthropology in the Genesis 1 claim that humanity is made in the image of God (1.26-27). If read with a prior commitment to the Stoic claim that rationality is a common attribute between the gods and human beings and is unique to human beings among earthly creatures, then it is natural to assume that the image of God must be rationality itself. Without such allegiance to Stoicism, it is highly implausible to interpret the image of God as rationality here, or to consider it equivalent to any other uniquely human faculty. Dismissing such attempts in commentary on this verse, Gordon Wenham comments that, given the sparsity of references to the image of God in the Old Testament, it is impossible to demonstrate any such claim, and one suspects that commentators are reading their own favourite human attributes into the text. 21 The Genesis text here cannot, therefore, be used as licence for not-animal anthropology: we need to seek the meaning of human living in the Bible, not insert independent anthropologies into gaps in the text. Clearly, Genesis here and in the verses that follow envisages a distinctive identity for human beings among God's creatures, but it is given in God's command, not left for humans to discover by deduction on the basis of zoological observation. 
b. Not-animal anthropologies are falsified by knowledge of other animal lives
In the discussion of Descartes's defence of the eternal nature of the soul, above, I noted that any suggestion that the borderlines between humanity and non-humanity and rationality and irrationality were not perfectly coincident would be fatal to his argument. Unfortunately for Descartes, and for other theological arguments structured similarly, it is even clearer now than it was in the seventeenth century that the exclusive identification of rationality with humanity cannot be defended. . 30 Elsewhere, I have noted that attempts to use human characteristic X to define a human/ non-human boundary that will be relevant in moral decision-making need to overcome three challenges: justification (Why should X be morally relevant?); boundary-matching (Does X reliably differentiate between all humans and all non-humans?); and degree (Is possession of X a matter of degree and, if so, are we committing to higher moral valuation for humans with more X?). Rationality, novel writing and abstract calculus each seem to fail all three tests.
this, we could claim that all humans have the potential to succeed at these achievements, but we need only to state such a claim to recognise its falsity. In fact, the only way of maintaining the unique identification between rationality and humanity that seems promising is to resort to doing so by definition: the philosopher Jonathan Bennett states that he uses '"rationality"
to mean "whatever it is that humans possess which marks them off, in respect of intellectual capacity, sharply and importantly from all other known species"'. whether they are to be included in the category of the human, there is no escaping the operation of the anthropological machine, or the dire consequences for those caught up in its machinations.
The second problematic consequence of false claims of human/non-human difference falls not on human beings, but on non-human animals. Where 'human' and 'animal' are used as exclusive categories in the context of anthropology, 'animal' becomes a negative category, erasing the particularity of non-human creatures in order to make use of them merely to frame the human. Jacques Derrida calls this a bêtise, or asinanity:
Confined within this catch-all concept, within this vast encampment of the animal, in this general singular, within the strict enclosure of this definite article ("the Animal"
and not "animals"), as in a virgin forest, a zoo, a hunting or fishing ground, a paddock or an abattoir, a space of domestication, are all the living things that man does not recognise as his fellows, his neighbors, or his brothers. And that is so in spite of the infinite space that separates the lizard from the dog, the protozoon from the dolphin, the shark from the lamb, the parrot from the chimpanzee, the camel from the eagle, the squirrel from the tiger or the elephant from the cat, the ant from the silkworm or the hedgehog from the echidna.
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Once we use animals as means to the end of establishing human identity in this way, we can no longer recognise them for what they are, in their particular modes of creaturely being.
Adam's first God-given human task was to encounter and recognise the animals in Eden and assumptions of almost the whole of the ancient world', there are no degrees of being. 38 In the species-solipsism of this second not-animal anthropology, we are in danger of undoing Basil's work, positing ourselves as an exception to the rule that creatures have the same ontological status before God, and reckoning ourselves as an exception to the rule.
The vocation of the human animal creature
If my diagnosis and evaluation of not-animal theological anthropologies is correct, we would do well to look for alternatives to it. I do not, unfortunately, have space for a developed
proposal, but suggest the following two complementary guidelines for theological anthropology to avoid the difficulties I have outlined thus far.
First, theological anthropology should avoid the first kind of not-animal anthropology by taking as its starting point our understanding of the relationship between God and humanity, rather than our understanding of the difference between human beings and other creatures. To do so avoids both the not-animal approaches we have seen to be theologically problematic and the problematic consequences for construals of human identity and the identities of other animals. Kelsey's account makes clear that nothing is lost and much is gained by a theological anthropology that turns its face away from an account based on differentiation from other animals and defines human identity outside the competitive logic that establishes human attributes through denying them to other animals. concern only for the human, whereas anthropocentrism denotes a central concern for the human with the acknowledgement that other creatures may be of peripheral concern. The difficulty here is the wide range of potential meaning of 'anthropocentrism'. Francis Watson says that anthropocentrism is inevitable for us, because our perspective is human (loc. cit.), but it is by no means clear that this perspectival anthropocentrism has any relevance for a judgement concerning whether God created everything for the sake of human beings, for example. A useful comparison here is egoism: because we see the world from our own point of view does not commit us to the moral view that we are more important than other human beings. I discuss kinds of anthropocentrism in Clough, On Animals I, pp. xvi-xx. discovered in relationship with and in response to God; naming ourselves as one of God's animal creations at once rules out any final definition of our identity through contrast with other animals and ensures that our anthropology is grounded in the animality we share with our closest creaturely neighbours; creature recalls the solidarity in creatureliness in which we exist alongside everything that God has made. We find what it means to be human in encounter with God in the context of our network of relationships with other human beings, other animals, and other creatures. 
